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1. INTRODUCTION
Receivables potentially constitute the single largest category
of assets transferred in cross-border financing transactions. Being
intangible, however, their transfer is not physically apparent. Because the problem of evidencing, or perfecting, these transfers has
been addressed in various ways by different countries, there is no
international perfection standard. This lack of a standard deters
the growth of receivables financing, which in turn impedes economic development. Recently, however, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
drafted a Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing
(the "Convention")1 to regulate cross-border receivables transactions. The Convention provides for an optional registration system for perfection.2 I use empirical evidence and historical analogy to argue that it is in the interest of the countries that become
parties to the Convention to opt for that system.
It has been noted that "in developed countries the bulk of
corporate wealth is locked up in receivables."3 As the economy
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1 See Draft Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing, U.N.
GAOR Int'l Trade Law. Comm., 28thSess., U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.JJ/WP.
96 (1998) [hereinafter Convention].
2 See id.
3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Para·
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Summary of
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becomes globalized, this wealth increasingly is unlocked by transferring receivables across national borders. 4 In this Article, I analyze how those transfers can be made more efficient, especially in
light of the Convention. 5
My analysis (Section 4) proceeds in three parts. In Section 4.1,
I briefly describe receivables financing, focusing on its increasingly dominant form, securitization. 6 In Section 4.2, I examine
the potential impact of the Convention and in Section 4.3, I use
empirical evidence and historical analogy to demonstrate the
benefits of a centralized registration system for perfection.
2. INTRODUCTION TO RECEIVABLES FINANCING
AND SECURITIZATION

Receivables financing 7 has experienced remarkable growth
over the past two decades, partly because receivables are selfliquidating and are an excellent short-term source of cash. 8 Perhaps the oldest and most basic form of receivables financing is factoring, in which companies- traditionally those in the textile and
4 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Langua~e of Cross-Border Finance, 8
DUKE J. COMPo & lNT'L L. 235, 236-37 (1998) [heremafter Universal Language].
5 This Article uses the Convention's terminology, referring to the obligor
of a receivable as its debtor. Readers should be careful to distinguish this usage
from the UCC's use of the term "debtor" to mean an assignor of receivables.
6 Article 5(d) of the Convention defines receivables financing as "any
transaction in which value, credit or related services are provided in the form
of receivables [and therefore to include] factoring, forfaiting, securitization,
project financing and refinancing." Convention, supra note 1 art. 5(d). Although the Convention does not appear to define the term receivables, I use
that term to include any financial asset that, by its terms, converts into cash
within a finite period of time. Examples include accounts receivable, chattel
paper, instruments, lease rentals, franchise and license fees, and other ri~hts to
or expectations of {layment. See generally Issuers of Asset-Backed SecuritIes, 17
C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(O)(1) (1999) (containing a similar definition).
7 Receivables financing is a subset of secured financing, and it is beyond
this Article's scope to question secured financing. For a debate on that Issue,
comE are Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority oJSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (arguing that giving full priority to secured financing is inefficient), with Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Easy Case/or the Priority o/Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47DUKE L.J. 425
(1997) (arguing not only that secured financing is efficient, but that securitization and other "non-recourse" forms of secured financing are particularly valuable).
8 See generally PETER H. WEIL, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ASSETBASED LENDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING (2d ed.
1992).
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apparel industries- raise money by selling their accounts receivable at a discount to finance companies, called "factors.,,9 The
company usually assumes all risk of non-payment of the accounts
except for the account debtor's inability to pay.lO
Another form of receivables financing is asset securitization.
Touted as "by far the most rapidly growing segment of the u.s.
credit markets," 11 asset securitization increasingly is becoming a
major part of foreign credit markets as well. l2 In a typical securitization, a company sells rights in receivables to a special purpose
vehicle ("SPV"). The SPY, in turn, issues securities to capital
market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for
the receivables. l3 The investors, who are repaid from collections
of the receivables, buy the securities based on their assessment of
the value of those assets. Because the Spy (and no longer the
company) owns the receivables, their investment decision often
can be made without concern for the company's financial condition. Thus, viable companies that otherwise cannot obtain financing because of a weakened financial condition can now do so.
Even companies that otherwise could obtain financing will now
be able to obtain lower-cost capital market financing. 14
9

See id. at 179.

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy 0/ Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L.,
Bus. & FIN. 133, 144 (1994) [hereinafter Alchemy] (quoting PETER H. WEIL,
FACfORING IN AsSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE §
27.01[1] (Matthew Bender ed., 1985».
11 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death o/Liability, 106 YALEL.J. 1,24 (1996).
12 See Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and
Structured Finance, 8 DUKEJ. COMPo & lNT'LL. 229 (1998) [hereinafter CrossBorder Symposium]. For an introduction to the fundainentaI legal principles of
cross-border securitization and finance, see generally Universal Language, supra
note 4.
13 For authorities on securitization, see generally TAMAR FRANKEL,
SECURITIZATION: STRUCfURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND
AsSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1999); JASON H.P. KRAVlTT, THE
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (1996); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCfURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and
Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill,Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996);AIcherny, supra note 10.
14 For an explanation of the relationsh~ between securitization and factoring, see Alchemy, supra note 10, at 144-46 tnoting that the differences between
factoring and securitization begin to blur where SPVs borrow funds from noncapital market sources instead of issuing securities or where factors issue capital
market securities).
10
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Securitization has an increasingly international focus, in part
because companies that wish to raise funds from capital markets
may not be located in countries with established capital markets
or may be located in countries with developing capital markets
that lack the depth of developed markets in other States. In order
to access capital market funding, those companies will have to
structure deals that cross their national borders. 15
Finally, an increasingly common variant of receivables financing is project finance. This involves the financing of development, construction, and operation of such capital-intensive facilities as power plants, oil and gas pipelines, transportation systems,
mining facilities, and industrial and manufacturing plants. 16 The
key is that these projects must be expected to generate revenues
sufficient to repay the financing. 17 In the construction phase of
the project, financing is usually raised by secured borrowing, with
equity provided by general or limited partnerships. After the
project's completion, permanent financing is raised in various
ways, including secured borrowing or leveraged leasing. 18
Recognizing that a growing segment of the world's money is
locked into receivables,19 and realizing the possibilities for economic growth by unleashing that wealth, UNCITRAL has undertaken a project to simplify cross-border receivables financing
and reduce its cost.20 UNCITRAL's work to that end has focused
on drafting the Convention.
3. THE IMPACT OF UNCITRAL's PROPOSED CONVENTION
Although this Article focuses on the Convention's optional
registration system for perfection, there is no doubt that, even absent a registration system, the Convention would still bring a significant measure of commercial uniformity to cross-border re-

15
16

See Universal Language, supra note 4, at 236-37.
See Daniel R. Bedford et. al., Project Financing, C749 A.L.I-A.B.A 177,

181 (1992).

See id.
See id.
19 See Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Fi·
nancing: UNClTRAL's Contribution, 8DUKEJ. COMPo & INT'LL. 315 (1998).
17

18

20 UNCITRAL's Working Group on International Contract Practices
("Working Group") ftrst began work on receivables ftnancing in 1995. See id.
at 316.
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ceivables financing, thereby enhancing its viability and reducing
its cost. Set forth below are a few brief examples.
Future Receivables. Receivables financing, especially securitization, increasingly depends on the assignment of future receivables, such as franchise or license fees. Yet, foreign law is often
unsettled as to whether or not to allow the assignment of receivables not yet in existence. The Convention would clarify that future receivables may be assigned. 21 Moreover, the Convention
would validate the assignment of receivables in bulk, without the
need to identify individual receivables, so long as "the receivabies ... can be identified [as receivables] ... to which the assignment relates. »22
Commingling. A significant risk in receivables financing is
that the mixing or "commingling» of collections of assigned receivables with the assignor's own funds may appear inconsistent
with the assignee's interest. The assignee could then lose its right
to those collections. The Convention would eliminate this risk.23
Contractual Restrictions. Sometimes the agreement pursuant
to which the receivables are created prohibits their assignment.
For example, leases and licenses sometimes prohibit assignment of
the underlying receivables even though the debtor would not be
harmed by the assignment of rights. An assignee would then be
deterred from engaging in receivables financing because of the
fear of liability, litigation, or the possible ineffectiveness of the assignment. The Convention permits assignments notwithstanding
the prohibition.2'~ However, the Convention still may protect
21 Article 10(2) of the Convention provides that " [a]n assignment may relate to existing or future. . . receivables, and to 1?arts of or unruvided interests
in receivables." Convention, supra note 1, art. lOl2). Article 9(2) clarifies that a
new writing is not required to be entered into for each receivable when it
arises. See iii. art. 9(2).
22 Id. art. 10(1)(b).
23 Article 17(2)-(3) of the Convention provides that "if payment is made to
the assignor ... [or to] another person, including ... a creClitor of the assis;nor
or the insolvency administrator, the assignee has a right in whatever is receIved
by that person." Id. art. 17(2)-(3). Article 16(1) also would lessen the likelihood
that commingling would occur, by authorizing the assignor or assignee to notify the debtor to pay the assisnee directly: "[T]he assignor or the assignee or
both may send the debtor notification of the assignment and request that payment be made to the assignee." Id. art. 16(1).
24 Article 12(1) of the Convention provides that "[a] receivable is transferred to the assignee notwithstanding any agreement between the assignor and
the debtor limiting [assignment] ...." Id. art. 12(1).
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debtors who would be harmed by the assignment. Although the
assignee is not liable to debtors for breach of contract, the assignor may be liable depending on the applicable nationallaw.25
The Convention also protects debtors by clarifying that the assignment of receivables does not increase their burden.26
Preferential and Fraudulent Transfers. Bankruptcy and insolvency laws often seek to assure equality of distribution of a company's estate and sometimes seek to rehabilitate troubled companies. The Convention does not cover this directly, but it does
generally specify the choice of insolvency law would apply.27
This allows the parties to a receivables financing to better understand their rights by consulting insolvency counsel who are experts in that law.
Perfection and Priority. Perfection is the term sometimes used
to describe protection of an assignee's interest in transferred assets
as against the assignor's creditors and insolvency administrator.
Because receivables are intangible, there is nothing physical to
transfer. Hence, the transfer of receivables may require additional
steps, such as notifying debtors on the receivables of the transfer,
to become effective. These steps, however, sometimes can be onerous and costly, thereby discouraging receivables financing. 28
Priority refers to the ranking of multiple claims against a
transferred asset. In a receivables financing context, the assignee
usually wants its claims against the transferred receivables to be
superior in ranking to any third-party claims, including that of
the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy as well as claims of other assignees from the same assignor.2 Priority is generally accorded to
the first assignee to perfect, under a rule sometimes referred to as

25 Article 12(2) of the Convention states that "[n]othing in this article affects any obligation or liability of the assignor to the debtor in respect of an
assignment made in breach of an agreement ... but the assignee is not liable to
the oebtor for such a breach." Id. art. 12(2).
26 Thus, Article 7(1) of the Convention provides that"assignment [has no]
... effect on rights and obligations of the deotor." Id. art. 7(1).
27 Article 24(2) of the Convention provides that priority between an assignee of receivables and the assignor's Insolvency administrator, is ~overned
by the law of the country where the assignor is located. Seeid. art. 24(2).
28 However, even where no additional steps are reguired, receivables financing may be discouraged. In Germany, for example, although no additional steps are needed, assignees have no publicly available means of ascertaining prionty. See infra notes 2944 and accompanying text.
29 See Universal lAnguage, supra note 4, at 241.
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"first in time, first in right."30 In international transactions, the
term priority sometimes is used to include the concept of perfection, because one cannot have priority unless one has perfected.
Without a system for making transfers of receivables publicly
ascertainable, receivables financings are discouraged because assignees will not be able to determine their priority at the time of
the transfer. The Convention proposes an optional registration
system that could be used to provide such notice. 31 Under that
system, "[a]s between assignees of the same receivables from the
same assignor, priority is determined by the order in which certain information ... is registered under this Convention, regardless of the time of [the] transfer of the receivables."32 A limitation, however, is that in the current draft of the Convention this
registration system is optional, not mandatory.33 Hence, different
States could adopt different perfection procedures, and the uniformity of a common registration system would not be achieved.
Without a common registration system, assignees of receivables
may be unable to search filing records to determine whether
those receivables previously were assigned to others. The assignee
then cannot ascertain through publicly available information the
priority of its rights in the receivables, and therefore may be
30 See, e.g., V.C.C. § 9-312(5). See also ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E.
SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 664-65 (2d
ed. 1991) (providing a critique of this rule).
31 Many of the "specific features" of the Convention's registration system
are still unresolved, however. See Electronic Mail from Spiro Bazinas to Steven
L. Schwarcz 1 (May 3, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Electronic Mail,
Bazinas]
32 Convention, supra note 1, art. 34. This rule contrasts with a rule that
would determine priority by the time of transfer of the receivables, which is
not always ascertamable.
33 Even absent a registration system, it should be noted that the Convention's rules on perfection and priority would increase clarity by specifying the
choice of law for determining priority. Because receivables are intangible and
not located in any given jurisCliction, the law of the assignor's jurisdiction lo~i
cally would be expected to govern perfection; the Convention so provides m
Article 23(1): "Priority among severo assignees of the same receivables from
the same assignor is ~overned by the law of the State in which the assignor is
located." Id. art. 23t1). The Convention also reco~nizes contractual subordination, or changing of relative priority. Article 23t2) provides that"conflicts
of ,eriority may be settled by agreement among competing assignees." Id. art.
23t2). This provides the flexibility to introduce commercially importantsecuritization structures, such as master trusts, in which different classes of investors in the SPY's securities could contract for different priority at different
times. See id. art. 23(1)-(2).
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forced to rely on representations of the assignor. Assignors that
are insufficiently capitalized to back up their representations
therefore may find it difficult to engage in a receivables financing.
Why is the Convention's proposed registration system merely
optional? Concerns over registration have been expressed in the
working group responsible for drafting the Convention, such as
that registration could violate privacy and confidentiality or could
negatively affect competition. 34 However, some believe these
concerns may be more speculative than real. 35
I am not competent to judge whether, politically, making registration mandatory would be a preferable strategy over the Convention's optional approach. In the former case, some States
might refuse to become signatories to the Convention, but those
that do would gain its full benefit; in the latter case, more States
would become signatories to the Convention, but those not opting for registration would lose the Convention's most significant
benefit. I next attempt to demonstrate that it is in each State's interest to opt for registration.
4. ANALYSIS

4.1.

A Centralized Registration System is Needed

Few would dispute the desirability of having uniform laws
govern cross-border commercial transactions such as receivables
financing. Inconsistencies between the laws of different States can
34 See generally Report ofthe Working Group on International Contract Practices on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth Session, U.N. GAOR, Int'l. Trade Law
Comm., 32nd Sess, Paragraphs 18-44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/445 (1999); Electronic_Mail, Bazinas, supra note 31. Those States with their own registration
systems could also find their systems replaced, jeopardizing internal jobs and
revenue production. In that context, a possible compromise might be to allow
States die option of retaining their own registration systems, to which the
Convention's choice of law rule would point. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (explainin~ that the U.S. perfection system works this way unaer
Article 9 of the UCC).
35 See, e.g., Electronic Mail from Alejandro Garro to Steven L. Schwarcz 12 (May 2, 1999) (on me with author) (observing that"much of the concerns are
raised by s.eecUlation, rather than mformed opinions as to the impact that a
mandatory international registration system would bring about," and comparing the aviation industry's proposed international registration system for security interests in aircraft pursuant to a protocol to the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law's ("UNIDROIT") Convention on Security Interests in Mobile Equipment).
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make "commercial practice uncertain, time-consuming, and expensive."36 The problem, at its simplest, is twofold: an assignee of
receivables from a foreign assignor may not know which State's
law governs perfection; furthermore, if the law of the assignor's
State applies, the assignee's rights would be subject to the vagaries
of that foreign law.37
The Convention would solve the first problem by making the
law of the assignor's State govern perfection. 38 Although it does
not necessarily solve the second problem, it does attempt to do so
by providing an optional registration system for perfection. 39 If,
therefore, the assignor's State has opted to adopt that system, perfection would be accomplished through registration.
There is, however, another layer to the perfection problema layer that is exacerbated by cross-border transactions, but that
could arise even in a purely domestic transaction. If the assignor's
State neither has adopted the Convention's registration system
nor enacted a domestic registration system for perfection, the assignee would be unable to ascertain the priority of its interest in
the transferred receivables. The following examples demonstrate
this potential problem.
Without some form of public registration, a system can establish perfection, but cannot unequivocally be used to ascertain priority. First, consider a wholly domestic transfer in which an assignor assigns a given receivable to an assignee in the same State.
If receivables transfers are not recorded, the assignee has no objective way of determining whether that receivable was previously
transferred to a third party.40 Likewise, unless the assignor discloses it, the assignee of a subsequent transfer by the assignor of
that receivable has no way of learning of the first transfer.
The situation becomes even more complicated for crossborder transfers. Consider a simple receivables transfer between
36 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process o/Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 940 (1995).

37 The assignor therefore may need to retain foreign counsel to be certain
of its rights.
38 See supra note 33 (referring to Article 23(1) of the Convention, which
provides that U[p ]riority among several assignees of the same receivables from
the same assignor is governed by the law of the State in which the assignor is
located").
39 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
40 Such a prior transfer might have been made, for example, through the
assignor's fraua or mistake.
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parties in two States, both of which have adopted the Convention
but only one of which- the assignee's State- has opted for the
Convention's registration system. Perfection and priority would
be governed by the law of the assignor's State. 41 However, unless
the assignor's State has a domestic registration system, the assignee would have the same difficulty ascertaining priority as described in the preceding paragraph.
The greater the number of transfers, the potentially more difficult the problem. Consider, for example, receivables transfers
among parties in three States, and assume that States 1 and 3 have
adopted the Convention and its registration system, but State 2
has adopted neither. Although it might appear that the priority
in receivables transferred between States 1 and 3 would be governed by the Convention's registration system, that result does
not necessarily follow. For example, an assignor in State 1 could
make a transfer of its receivables to an initial assi~nee in State 2.
If that assignee perfects under its domestic law,4 it would reasonably expect to have priority as to those receivables. Later,
however, the assignor either fraudulently or mistakenly could
transfer all or a portion of the same receivables to a subsequent
assignee in State 3. If the subsequent assignee searches the international registration system, sees no prior recording as to those
receivables, and then perfects the transfer in accordance with international registration procedures, the subsequent assignee would
reasonably expect to have priority rights in those receivables.
Thus, there is a conflict of priority between the rights of the initial assignee and the subsequent assignee.
Tinkering with the system- for example, restricting international registration to cross-border transfers of receivables- would
also fail to solve the problem. Consider an assignor in State 1 that
makes a domestic transfer of receivables to an initial assignee in
the same State. If the initial assignee perfects this transfer under
domestic law, that assignee would reasonably expect to have priority as to those receivables. Later, however, the assignor either
fraudulently or mistakenly could transfer all or a portion of the
same receivables to a subsequent assignee in State 3. If the subsequent assignee searches the international registration system, sees

See supra note 33.
This assumes that the conflicts law of State 2 points to that State's domestic law for perfecting transfers to in-State assignees.
41

42
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no prior recording as to those receivables, and then perfects this
cross-border transfer in accordance with international registration
systems procedures, the subsequent assignee would reasonably
expect to have priority rights in those receivables. Again, a conflict of priority exists between the rights of the initial assignee and
the subsequent assignee.
The same dilemma arises when the first assignment is international. Consider an assignor in State 1 that transfers receivables
to an initial assignee in State 3. If the initial assignee perfects this
cross-border transfer in accordance with international registration
procedures, it would reasonably expect to have priority rights in
those receivables. Later, however, the assignor, either fraudulently or mistakenly, could transfer all or a portion of the same
receivables to a subsequent assignee in State 1. If the subsequent
assignee follows the domestic procedures for ascertaining priority,
sees no prior transferee, and then perfects this domestic transfer
in accordance with the domestic law of State 1, the subsequent assignee would reasonably expect to have priority rights in those
receivables. Once again, there is a conflict of priority between
the rights of the initial assignee and the subsequent assignee.
Other tinkering approaches would equally fail to solve the
problem. For example, registration could not be limited to transfers of international receivables, i.e., those having foreign debtors,
because international receivables are often transferred domestically.43 Consider an assignor in State 1 that makes a domestic
transfer to an assignee in State 1 of international receivables of a
debtor in another State. The way out of this morass is for all
States, or at least those with companies needing access to the liquidity provided by receivables financing, to adopt a centralized
registration system for perfection.44
I next examine empirical studies showing that centralized registration is not only the most effective domestic perfection sys43 Indeed, the same receivables, irrespective of the location of the debtors,
could be transferred domestically one day and internationally the next, or vice
versa.
44 Even the registration system proposed by the Convention does not ~o as
far as it theoretically should because it covers only: assignments of internatIOnal
receivables- those in which the assignor and debtor are located in different
States- and international assignments of receivables- those in which the assignor and assignee are located in different States. See Convention, SURra note 1,
arts. 1(a), 3. The author shows above, however, that a rational peifection and
priority system should cover the assignments of all receivables.
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tern, but it will raise a State's gross domestic product by increasing corporate access to credit. Thereafter, I discuss the increasing
number of civil and common law States that recently have
adopted centralized registration systems. Finally, I show by analogy that the development of centralized registration in the federal
system of the United States provides compelling evidence in favor
of a cross-border registration system.

4.2.
4.2.1.

Empirical Evidence Supports Centralized Registration
Evidence from Empirical Studies

Empirical studies by the Center for the Economic Analysis of
Law (the "Center") confirm the importance of a registration system, even for domestic transfers of receivables. 45 The Center
studied how inadequate legal frameworks in three States- Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Romania- limited access to credit. In
Guatemala, for example, there was no registration system for perfection of receivables transfers. The absence of such a system was
a key constraint on economic development: "Compared to a borrower who cannot offer good collateral, a borrower with such
collateral can expect to get six to eight times more credit.... "46
A registration system, however, would encourage the extension
of credit by enabling lenders to ascertain their priority:
By encumbering as collateral [their] portfolios of accounts
or small loans, businesses could obtain the cash necessary
to purchase more inventories and generate even more
sales. Where such financing is possible, it permits credit to
expand rapidly in response to the needs of the business .... Accounts receivable are often the only unencum-

45 See infra notes 46, 47, and 56 and accompanying text. These studies are
empirical in that they rely on numerous field interviews.
46 Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de la Peiia, Guatemala: How Problems in
the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit (Nov. 1998)
<http://www.ceal.org> . [hereinafter Guatemala]. The study further observed that "[t]he problem of the limited access to credit has been recognized
everywhere as constraining growth and aggravating poverty." Id. at 2.

1999]

CROSS·BORDER RECEIVABLES FINANCING

467

bered floating assets that a [business] has available to secure a loan for working capital.47

Productivity per worker gains when farms and businesses
can profitably hold larger inventories ....48

Under Guatemalan law, the assignment of receivables is
perfected by notification of debtors. That approach, however, not only was found to be "costly because it requires notifying each account debtor," but the system is also risky.
"There is no requirement that all transfers of accounts be registered in a public registry to prevail in collecting against the
accounts." 49 Therefore, "[t]he whole secured transactions
framework becomes more risky because potential lenders
cannot easily discover all existing claims in collateral .... "50
The study found that the absence of centralized registration
was the most significant explanation for why credit was limited.
Adjusting for inflation, Guatemalan borrowers, if they are offered
loans at all, pay thirty-three to thirty-eight percentage ?t0ints
higher interest than u.s. borrowers on equipment loans. I Of
that additional cost, "[a]bout 4.34 percentage points arise from
macroeconomic uncertainty, 1.76 percentage points arise from
the greater bank spreads, and the balance arises from the extra
risk of equipment lending in the Guatemalan framework for se-

47 [d. at 14. Accord, Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de la Pefia, Nicaragua:
How Problems in the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit
(Feb. 1998) <http://www.ceal.org> [hereinafter Nicaragua].
48 Guatemala, supra note 46, at 43 (contrasting "[a] secured transaction system that directs credit away from more rapidly growing businesses and toward
slower growing businesses [which] is not the system that will promote the
most economic growth.").
49 [d. at 14.
so [d. at 19.
51 See id. at 29. Although these data relates to equipment loans, I would
expect approximately the same interest rate differentIal to apply to loans secured by receivables because the perfection and priority problem is similar.

468

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 20:3

cure[d] transactions."52 Therefore, twenty-seven to thirty-two
percentage points of Guatemala's interest rate cost "arises entirely
from the laws and legal procedures that govern lending against
movable property.,,53 By way of comparison, the Center's study
of Nicaragua found that twenty to twenty-five percentage points
of interest rate cost was attributed to defects in that State's
framework for secured transactions. 54 The study also reported
that "[u]nder a variety of simplifying assumptions [reform of the
legal framework for secured transactions in Argentina and Bolivia] could raise Argentine GDP by 6% to 8%" and could raise
Bolivian GDP by 3% to 9%?
The Center's studies of the legal frameworks for secured
transactions in Romania and Nicaragua found similar problems
caused bl the absence of centralized registration systems for perfection. 5 The studies also reported that these problems have been
observed in other civil law States such as Argentina, Mexico,
Id.
Id. The absence of centralized registration is, of course, only part of the
reason for this cost, but probably the most significant part. See supra text ac52

53

companying note 46 (noting that the absence of centralized registration is the
most significant explanation for why credit is limited).
54 See Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 27. Again, the absence of centralized registration is only part of the reason for this cost, but probably the most significant part. See supra note 46.
55 Guatemala, supra note 46, at 44. Subsequent studies by the Center for
the Economic Analy:sis of Law indicate the same or even larger gain in GDP.
See Electronic Mail from Heywood W. Fleisig to Steven L. Schwarcz (May 6,
1999) (on file with the author).
56 In Nicaragua, for example, "[p]erfection rules do not call for registries
that provide for a public and mexEensive means of finding out whether prior
encumbrances in collateral exist. The rules for the priority of secured lenders
do not clearly rank interests in collateral." Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 2. As a
result, "secret priorities create substantial risks to other potential lenders and
thereby limit the usefulness of the secured transaction framework." Id. at 19.
Indeed, "[a]ccounts receivable and chattel paper had no value as collateral for
loans." Id. at 16. These problems even overcame attempts by the Nicaraguan
government to stimulate agricultural credit by setting up a system "that would
disburse through J?rivate for-profit institutions. . .. Private lenders, in [this]
framework ... took great care to disburse only: where loans could be collected.
However, in most cases this improvement in [lending] efficiency took place at
the expenses of reaching the target ~roups [which had] even less access to
credit." Id. at 3. Likewise, in Romarua, in which perfection requires notification of debtors, no borrowing credit is given based solely on accounts receivable collateral. See Nuria de la Pefia & Heywood W. Fleisig, Romania: How
Problems in the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit (Sep.
1998 discussion draft) < http://www.ceal.org > [hereinafter Romania].
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Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, and EI Salvador as well as in common law States such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 57
These empirical studies are not merely academic. An increasing number of States have been adopting centralized registration
precisely for the reasons noted by the studies: to improve their
economy by increasing access to lower-cost credit. I set forth the
following five examples: Japan, Poland, and Hungary, which are
from civil law systems; and Canada and Australia, which are from
common law systems.
4.2.2.

An Increasing Number o/States Have Been Adopting
Centralized Registration

Japan adopted a centralized registration system in 1998_ Previously, perfection required notification of debtors, which was a
significant impediment to securitization. 58 To encourage and
lower the cost of securitization, a new law was adopted allowing
constructive notice by registration: 59 «if the claim assignment is
registered in a claim assignment registration file, it shall be regarded, in relation to a third party, that notice ... is given to the
debtors [on the date of registration], as provided for under Article
467 of the Civil Code."60 The priority rule therefore is first in
time, first in right. 61

57 See Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 5. See also Boris Kozolchyk, The Basis
for Proposed Lee,islation to Modernize Secured Financing in Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEx.
L.J.43 (1997) (Cliscussing the need for a centralized registration system for perfection of security interests in Mexico). Kozolchyk claims that without such a
"system of registration for security interests," commercial credit will not be
accessible for "small and medium-slZed Mexican [enterprises]." Id. at 47-48. As
a result, Mexico is in the process of considering legislation which would create
a centralized registration system. Id. at 50-52.
58 See Roy B. True, New Developments in Japanese Asset Securitization:
Open the Floodgates (visited Mar. 31, 1999) <http://www.tuj.ac.jp/law/ assetsec.htm1>.
59 Saikenjyoto no Taikoyoken ni kansuru Minpo no Tokureito ni kansuru
Horitsu [The Law Prescribin~ Exceptions, etc. to the Civil Code Requirements
for Setting Up Against a ThIrd Party to an Assi~nment of Claims], Law No.
104 of 1998 (effective October 1, 1998). RegistratlOn would be deemed to constitute notification. The author thanks Japanese attorney Makoto Isshiki,
LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law for assistance m interpreting this
law.
60 Id. art. 2(1).
61 Some confusion could arise when perfection first occurs through actual
notification, as opposed to registration.
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In 1996, the Polish Parliament enacted a new secured transactions law that substitutes registration for a physical pledge in order to achieve perfection. 62 Under that law, a security interest, referred to as a "registered pledge," may be granted in moveable
assets and in assignable rights, such as receivables. 63 The security
interest is perfected when registered in the appropriate district
commercial court. 64 Moreover, the law chanres the old possessory priority rule of last in time, last in right6 to a first in time,
first in right rule based on the timing of registration. 66 The rationale for the law was that "a reliable universal registering system is sine qua non for the banks to proceed with a responsible
credit policy.,,67
In 1996, the Hungarian Parliament enacted a new secured
transactions law. 68 Under that law, a security interest, referred to
as a lien, may be granted in moveable things and in transferable
rights or claims. 69 The security interest is perfected when registered in a registIfo kept with the Hungarian National Chamber of
Notaries Public. 0 The priority rule is based on first in time, first
in right. 71
62 See Ustawa 0 zastawie regestrowym i regestrze zastaw6w [Law on Registered Pledge and Pled~e Register] Dz. U. Nr 149, poz. 703 Uournal of Law No.
149, item 703] (pol.) tenacted December 6, 1996 and later amended in 1997 and
1998); Tomasz Dabrowski, Poland's New Security Instrument- Registered
Pledge, 8 SURV. E. EUR. L. 1, 8 (1997).
63 See Dabrowski supra note 62.
64

See id.

Even in the U.S., perfection of possessory security interests would follow this rule because a prior pledgee that no longer possesses the collateral
would be unsecured. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1995) (providing that perfection by
possession "continues only so long as possession is retained.").
66 See Dabrowski, supra note 62, at 8 (noting that under prior law, a subsequent pledge would prevail over a prior pledge, absent bad fruth).
67 Lech Choroszucha, Secured Transactions in Poland: Practicable Rules,
65

Unworkable Monstrosities, and Pending Reforms, 17 HASTINGS lNT'L & COMPo

L. REv. 389,409 (1994); see also id. at 423 (arguing that this law will help "provide for stability and predictability in commercial lending transactions").
68 CODE CIVIL [C.CIv.] act XXVI (Hung.). The author thanks Hungarian
attorney Szilvia Horvath, LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law, for assistance in finding and interpreting this law and the related Ministry of Justice
comments.
69 See id. § 252(1).
70 See id. § 260(2».
71 See id. § 263(2» {stating that "if the same obj~ct under lien is encumbered by several liens, ... the right of satisfaction shall be due to the lienors in
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Canada's perfection scheme, by contrast, has been adopted
province by province over the past two decades in an attempt to
modernize personal property security laws.72 The Canadian
scheme follows the Uniform Personal Property Security Act (the
"PPSA"), "[a]n indispensable feature of [which] is the registry system that is at the core of the priority structure of the Act."73 Section 25 of the PPSA provides that registration of a financing
statement perfects a security interest in collateral74 and Section 43
establishes a first in time, first in right priority rule, based on the
timing of registration. 75 At least one commentator noted that the
"PPSA's have been an unqualified success. There are very few
Canadians who have any interest in returning to the systems they
displaced." 76
Finally, Australia has a national system for recording security
interests, referred to as "charges," that are granted by companies.77 The priority rule is first in time, first in right, according to
the timing of registration. 78
In short, empirical studies by the Center for the Economic
Analysis of Law show that centralized registration increases the
the order of the inception of their respective liens, [inception being determined
by the time of registration).
n See generally Ross Buckley, Personal Property Security Law in Canada:
The Revolution Is Nearly Complete, 72 AUSTI. L.J. 918 (1998) (describing this
new legal regime, whicli has been adopted by all the common law provinces of
Canada other than Newfoundland, where the bill is now pending, and observin~ that a J?arallel conceptual regime has been adopted by the civil law province
of Quebec). The Canadian regime appears to oe closely patterned on UCC
Article 9. ld. at 919. It even deems "sales of accounts and chattel paper to be
security agreements, principally to avoid difficult problems of diStinguishing
between transactions Intended for security and those not so intended." ld.
73 ld. at 918.
74 See UNIF. PERSONAL PROPERTY SEC. ACT § 25 (Uniform Law Conference of Canada Consolidated Statutes 1983) [hereinafter"PPSA"]
75 PPSA § 43(2) provides that "[r]egistration of a financing statement is effective from the time assigned to it in the office of the registry." PPSA §
35(1)(a) further provides tliat "priority between perfected security interests in
the same collateral is determined by the order of the occurrence of the ...
registration of a financing statement ...." ld. § 43(2).
76 Buckley, supra note 72, at 923. See also id. at 918 (observing that "[t]here
is little dissent now that the legislation has met and surpassed the objectives of
its proponents").
77 See Corporations Act, 1989, § 262 (Austl.). The author thanks Australian attorney, Matthew Symon, LL.M 1999, Duke University School of Law,
for assistance in finding and interpreting this law.
78 See id. § 280(1).
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availability of credit and reduces its cost. An increasing number
of civil and common law States have recently voted with their
feet in agreement, adopting centralized registration systems. 79
States that oppose centralized registration therefore may wish to
re-think whether their opposition is justified.
I next argue that the evolution of perfection and priority rules
in the United States further underscores the value of centralized
registration. I analogize the federal system of the United States,
under which each state had its own law governing perfection, to
the international scheme today under which each sovereign State
has its own perfection law. 80
4.3.

The Development of Centralized Registration in the Federal
System ofthe United States Provides Compelling Evidence
in Favor ofa Cross-Border Registration System

The UCC governs, among other things, the perfection and
priority of the transfer of receivables between parties in different
states in the United States. It reflects almost a century of experimentation by those states to try to reach the most efficient and
effective perfection system. Thus, an analysis of the events leading up to the UCC's adoption may shed light on the cross-border
receivables perfection debate. Historically, receivables financing
in the United States had its roots in traditional factoring, in
which "typically the assignee (or factor) notified the account
debtor that the account had been assigned to him and directed
that payments be made to him and not to the assignor."8t Begin79 The process of adoption continues. In New Zealand, for example, a new
Personal Property Securities Bill based on the Canadian PPSA is at the select
committee stage, and submissions are currently being heard. Although some
believe it will be enacted in 2000, the timing is uncertain. See Electronic Mail
from Steve Flynn, attorney with Simpson Grierson and member of the New
Zealand Law Society committee that reviewed this Bill, to Andrew McNee,
LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with
author).
80 I realize, of course, that analogies are useful but not necessarily definitive. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 519 (1995) rarguiIlg
that "[a]nruogies can be suggestive, even illuminating" but might not be sufficiently on point by reason of different facts or policles)with Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1993) (arguing that an analogy is most useful when the right outcome cannot be derived from theory
alone).
81 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §
8.1, at 251 (1965).
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ning in the 1930's, however, a new form of receivables financing
arose under which "account debtors were no longer notified of
the assignment and continued to make payments to their original
creditor, the assignor."82 By the 1950's, receivables financing was
split between non-notification receivables financing and traditional factoring. 83
These forms of receivables financing created practical and legal
problems, some practical and some legal. As a practical matter,
because:
there is no evidence of the claim which can be symbolically treated as the claim itself and thus transferred in possession [such as would be the case for a negotiable instrument], the problem of priorities early became and long
remained a matter of controversy and a thorn in the judicial flesh. 84
Assignees of receivables bore the risk that the assignor would
assign (or perhaps already had assigned) the same receivables to
another assignee.
In response, different states established different rules to try to
address the priority problem posed by receivables financing. Indeed, "[i]n few [other] common law areas did so many diverse
rules establish themselves or so long and so inconclusively contend among themselves for supremacy.,,85 For example, certain
states, such as New York, followed the rule that perfection is effectively achieved by "policing" the sold receivables through
monitoring and collecting the payments thereon. 86 The cost and
expertise needed to comply with this rule made non-notification
receivables financing "the exclusive preserve of the sales finance

82 Id. (describinl? this new form of factoring as "non-notification" or "indio
rect collection" receivables financing).
83 See id.
84 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §
25.6, at 670 (1965).
85

Id.

See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (finding an unpoliced transfer of receivables fraudulent under New York law as against creditors of the
assignor).
86
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companies ... [and] larger banks."87 Other states followed the
English rule of Dearie v. Hall88_ a rule similar to that which prevails in many foreign countries even today89- "under which, as
between successive assignees of the same claim, the one who first
notifies the [account] debtor of his assircnment prevails, even
though his assignment is the later in time." 0
These problems were compounded in interstate transactions.
Say, for example, an assignor in New York, which followed the
policing rule, transferred receivables to an assignee in Pennsylvania, which followed the debtor notification rule. To ensure perfection, the parties might have to comply with both rules,
thereby duplicating cost and effort.
These issues came to a head when the United States Supreme
Court held that because the failure to notify debtors prevented
perfection of the transfer in states that followed Dearie v. Hall,
the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy could have avoided the unperfected transfer. 91 This caused great uncertainty in the receivables financing community. In response, "the majority of states
enacted statutes [that] were designed to preserve non-notification
financing." 92
This led to a heated debate as to the best method of perfection, with different states experimenting with differing approaches. 93 Business interests argued that transfers of receivables
should be automatically deemed to be perfected, because they
were concerned that their credit "would be adversely- even disastrously- affected if [their] creditors learned that [they were] as87 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.1, at 252; see also id. § 8.3, at 260-61 (describing the "assignee's unremitting supervision of the assignor's enterprise"
that constituted "policing" to comply with Benedict). This rule still created
problems, however, where assignors were the more competent party to monitor and enforce collections for the account of the assignee.
88 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828). Professor Gilmore refers to an
estimate that "6 states and the District of Columbia definitely followed [this]
rule, 7 states probably followed [this] rule, [and] 10 states were in extreme confusion as to which rule they followed." 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.6, at
273 n.8.
89 Indeed, research by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Law indicates that this rule is seen in both common and civil law countries. See supra
text accompanying notes 55-56.
90 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.6, at 273.
91 See Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
92 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.1, at 253.
93 See ide § 8.7, at 274 et seq. (discussing the debate among states).
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signing [their] accounts_,,94 Others argued for a registration system. The experience of states that chose a registration system
showed that registration would not adversely affect, but would
increase, the availability of credit: "[o]nce filing statutes had been
passed in a few states, the argument that a public record of assignments would destroy business credit became more difficult to
make.... In the final count, filing statutes considerably outnumbered [automatic perfection] statutes.,,95
The subsequent promulgation of the uee, in 1953, resolved
these issues for all interstate (as well as intrastate) transfers. It followed the lessons learned from the state debate, adopting a centralized registration system96 and rejecting the requirements of policing and debtor notification. 97 This registration system gave
"other creditors the opportunity to ascertain from public sources
whether property of their debtor [here, in the uee sense, meaning the borrower] or prospective debtor is subject to secured
claims." 98 As a result, interstate receivables transfers have been
greatly facilitated, while their cost has been significantly lowered.
I recognize, of course, that the u.s. experience with the uee and
registration does not necessarily compel the conclusion that foreign states with fundamentally different legal, economic or cultural systems also should adopt centralized registration. N onethe-

94
95

Id. § 8.7, at 275.
Id.

96 The VCC registration system is not, however, centralized in an orthodox way. Rather, each state maintains its own centralized registration system,
and choice of law rules determine which state's system will apply to a Earticular transfer. See V.C.C. § 9-103 (1995). My sug~ested compromise of allowing
states the oFtion of adopting (or retaining) their own centralized registration
~stems, subject to the Convention's choice of law rule that points to the perfection system of the assignor's State, would follow that approach. See supra
note 34.
97 See id. (explaining that "[b]y the time Article 9 of the [Uniform Commercial] Code came to be drafted, it was a foregone conclusion that, with resEect to receivables, it would be a ruing statute and not even the most violent
aavocate of [automatic perfection] made more than a pro forma protest for the
record").
98 Official Comment No.3 to V.C.c. § 9-205 (1995) (further eXElaining
that "[t]he repeal of the Benedict rule under this section [9-205] must be read
in light of these [flling] provisions"); accord V.C.C. § 9-205 (providing that "raJ
security interest is not Invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral .
•. or to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper ....").
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less, the u.s. experience is persuasive in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.
5. CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence and historical analogy demonstrate the
benefits of a centralized registration system for perfection of receivables financing. It increases corporate access to lower cost
credit, which in turn increases a State's gross domestic product.
Absent such a system, receivables financings are discouraged because assignees may be unable to know their priority. Therefore,
it appears to be in each State's interest that the Convention provides, and that each State opts for, centralized registration.

